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ABSTRACT: Uncertain knowledge must be communicated to the public, as environmental problems can 
potentially reach many people. Uncertainty communication is assumed by some to increase public trust in science 
and policy makers, by others to produce public panic. We have used focus groups for getting insights about this 
assumption and more generally about peoples' attitudes following uncertainty communication, for the controversy 
on the effects of endocrine disrupters (EDs) on human male fertility. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Scientific controversies related to public health issues are often characterized by a significant 
level of uncertainty. Despite this uncertainty, available knowledge must be communicated to 
the public, who is potentially in danger. Nevertheless, all science communicators do not share 
the conviction that uncertainty should be communicated to the public. Empirical work in the 
realm of science communication reveals skepticism among scientists, who assume that 
communicating uncertainty will result in a negative public reaction. Many of the scientists 
surveyed by Frewer et al. (2003) thought that informing the public of uncertainty would lead to 
increased distrust in science and scientific institutions, as well as cause panic and confusion 
regarding the extent and impact of a particular hazard. The general public might perceive 
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reports of uncertainty within risk communications as evasiveness or as an admission of 
ignorance (Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen, & Heath, 1987). Lay people are supposed to expect 
certainty and to be disappointed by uncertainty communication, which could leave them an 
impression of arbitrariness (Renn, 2011).  
 Empirical appraisal of peoples’ attitudes and feelings, as they receive messages about 
scientific uncertainty, is currently needed, as previous research showed contradictory results. 
Many studies cite beneficial effects, such as reducing public perception of risks and increasing 
the credibility of scientific and/or risk-assessment agencies (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; 
Habicht, 1992; Van der Sluijs, 2002; Patt & Schrag, 2003). Citizens who are aware of 
uncertainty are thought to make more informed decisions (Carnegie Commission, 2011) and to 
be more willing to reduce catastrophic risks (Slovic, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1984).  
 Other results show that uncertainty can be disturbing, which can lead to denial (Slovic 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982; Weinstein, 1987) or even outrage (Slovic, 1993). 
Paradoxically, desire for certainty is nevertheless not universal—only a third of the sample in 
one study expressed a desire for certainty (Johnson & Slovic, 1996). Johnson and Slovic 
(1995) showed that communicating uncertainty has ambiguous consequences, signalling 
honesty to some and dishonesty to others (Johnson & Slovic, 1995, 1996).  
 Much of the literature in the field of experimental economics has focused on how 
people react to uncertainty and on whether/how the way this uncertainty is communicated 
influences decision making. A central result is that, in most situations, individuals tend to 
adopt a much more risk-averse decision stance when faced with ambiguity and poorly-defined 
risk (Chow & Sarin, 2001), potentially due to feeling a lack of control (Heath & Tversky, 
1991). Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, (1982) analyzed how people assess the probability that 
uncertain events will occur and showed that a limited number of heuristic processes are 
involved; for example, representativeness, availability, and anchoring. The way in which 
uncertainty communication elicits these heuristics may influence people’s judgments. The 
perception of uncertainty was influenced by whether it was communicated within a positive or 
negative framework (Kuhn, 1997).  
 The case of endocrine disrupters (EDs) and their effects on male fertility provide a 
good example of uncertain and controversial science; this is therefore a good case study for our 
theoretical investigation. EDs are “exogenous substances that alter function(s) of the endocrine 
system and consequently cause adverse health effects in an intact organism, or its progeny, or 
(sub)populations” (Commission of the European Communities, 1999). EDs are thought to 
contribute to the incidence of diseases such as cancer, diabetes, obesity, and reproductive 
disorders (decline in number and quality of sperm, testicular cancer, earlier puberty, etc.). 
Most, if not all the population, is exposed to them, but the ED issue is relatively new and 
currently controversial.  
2. METHODS 
In line with previous literature (Brashers, 2001, Powell, Dunwoody, Griffin, & Neuwirth, 
2007), we distinguish expressed from received (or perceived) uncertainty, according to the 
assumption that the scientific message transforms during the communication process between 
the emitter (i.e., the scientist) and the receptor (i.e., lay public). Expressed and perceived 
uncertainty must be analyzed as two interrelated but different entities. 
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 Eleven focus groups consisting of five to twelve laypeople, were organized between 
October 2010 and May 2011. Each group was homogenous for the following criteria, and the 
wide variety between the groups was intended: 1. High-revenue1 mothers of children younger 
than three; 2. Low-revenue mothers of children younger than three; 3. Men and women with 
advanced scientific education; 4. Low-revenue men under 30 (young), without children; 5 and 
6. High-revenue young men, without children (2 groups) 7. High-revenue young women, 
without children 8. Religious women (practicing); 9. High-revenue men and women over 40; 
10. Low-revenue man and women over 40; 11. Farmers. 
 Each group participated in a three-hour meeting and each meeting followed the same 
protocol. The meetings started with a ten-minute introduction to the topic. Participants were 
then invited to read a one-page text, watch a short video2 and then discuss both. This text + 
video + discussion sequence was repeated four times. The first four sequences were organized 
in two pairs of two; each pair included one text and one video without (expressed) uncertainty 
and with (expressed) uncertainty. The fifth contained uncertainty expressed by industry 
scientists, instead of academic scientists (as the first four).  
 If additional time remained, the groups would watch two or three more videos. The 
four texts were selected from a single popular science book and the videos were all extracted 
from a documentary or from scientific videos freely available on the Internet. A 20- to 30-
minute group discussion followed each text + video sequence.  
 The meetings were video-recorded and discussions were transcribed. The transcripts 
were coded by two (9) researchers or three (2) researchers; each individual coding was then 
discussed. This process led to the identification of the following six categories of discussions:  
• the reference science model (frame);  
• sociopolitical and economic framing of science;  
• non-scientific references for assessing the relevance of the message;  
• characteristics of the communication format (text or video);  
• perceived uncertainty sources;  
• feelings.  
Coding revealed several classes for each category.  
 Two categories (perceived uncertainty sources and one feeling, i.e., fear) are analyzed 
in the present communication.  
 Deviant-case analysis (Silverman, 2011) allowed us to systematically analyze the 
transcripts and ensured that we interpreted them as objectively as possible. The purpose of the 
analysis was to derive propositions that applied to all the data to arise from the focus groups. 
The analyst progressively modified the expression of his/her results to incorporate deviant 
cases.  
 After the presentation of each set of text and video, the participants were invited to 
express their judgment on the statement: Some substances present in our environment produce 
a decline in male fertility, in humans. This judgment had to be expressed using a figure on the 
scale proposed by Weiss (2003) (table I), as a communication tool in controversies, when 
                                                
1  We define revenue above 2000 € per household as high and revenue below this amount as low. 
2  The Eurobarometer report “Scientific research in the media” (2007) showed that most people in the EU get 
their scientific information from television. 
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generalists untrained in sciences must understand the merits of opposing arguments in disputes 
among scientific experts. 
Table I. Scale of perceived degrees of uncertainty (modified). 
Level 
(Score) Convincingness of the evidence (Standard of proof) 
10 Beyond any doubt 
9 Beyond a reasonable doubt 
8 Clear and convincing evidence 
7 Clear showing 
6 Substantial and credible evidence 
5 Preponderance of the evidence 
4 Clear indication 
3 Probable cause: reasonable grounds for belief 
2 Reasonable, articulable grounds for suspicion 
1 No reasonable grounds for suspicion 
0 Impossible 
PP Cannot express 
At the end of each sequence (video and text), each subject chose a value from 0 to 10 
corresponding to her/his PDU (Perceived Degree of Uncertainty). The statistical analysis 
aimed at answering two questions:  
• Is there a global increase or decrease of uncertainty judgments when a researcher 
communicates or not uncertainty? 
• Are there different patterns of change in uncertainty judgments, depending on 
people’s socio-economic characteristics? 
Two tests are used to establish the significance or not of the results:  
• the Sign test, which indicates the significance of a general decrease or increase;  
• the Chi2 test of independence, which indicates the significance or not of differences 
between subsets of subjects, e.g., the subsets of age groups. 
3. UNCERTAINTY RECEPTION: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Our definition of uncertainty is inspired by post-normal science, which distinguishes several 
dimensions: technical (inexactness), methodological (unreliability), epistemological 
(ignorance) and societal ((un)robustness) (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990). 
 According to this choice, the messages used in our empirical setting contained 
different types of uncertainty in the different sequences. The test messages have been 
structured by pair. The first sequence (text + video) did not contain uncertainty but presented 
epidemiological data about sperm decline. The second sequence did contain uncertainty related 
to the information presented in the first video, from the epistemological (referring to the 
strength of the causal relationship and to the available scientific knowledge about the human 
body), the methodological and the technical classes.  
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 The second pair included a sequence presenting toxicological results on animal 
studies together with data about human exposures to EDs, and a sequence containing 
epistemological uncertainty associated to extrapolation from animals to humans, and 
epistemological uncertainty related to the causal relationship and the form of the dose-response 
relationship.  
 We found that, in reaction to scientific messages, laypeople raise more and different 
uncertainties than those contained in the original message communicated by researchers. In 
reaction to the sequences (text + video) in which uncertainty was not included in the 
communication, group discussions nevertheless highlighted a significant number of perceived 
uncertainties. Thus, even if the first sequence did not address uncertainty, during the 
discussions participants extensively questioned this causal relationship—they were particularly 
concerned about the link being weak. Many participants formulated their own multi-causal 
hypotheses to explain the epidemiological data presented.  
 Though participants received information about repeated studies that link reproductive 
disorders to EDs, they systematically questioned whether the data was complete. This technical 
uncertainty in the data was the most frequent type highlighted by participants for all the 
sequences of text and video, with and without uncertainty. Participants either explicitly felt that 
the information they received lacked precise details, or that it was simply not enough, though 
they did not indicate what they felt was missing. The data chosen by science communicators 
from all was a debated question. Participants concluded that selectively choosing data to 
communicate can either lead to concerns about the unavoidable simplification needed to 
popularize science or to suspicions about the intentions behind this selection.  
 Methodological uncertainty was also brought up by participants during discussions 
that followed sequences both with and without uncertainty. For example, the choice of 
parameters used to measure male fertility was questioned, in particular the choice of the sperm 
count as a measure of male fertility or of the pesticide content in urine as a parameter for 
determining the causal origin of the observed decline in sperm counts.  
 Several participants insisted on the importance of knowing the details of the methods 
together with the results themselves. The willingness of researchers to communicate details of 
their protocols seemed to be more relevant than the technical content of the methods itself.  
 Among all the types of uncertainty communicated during the focus groups, 
extrapolation uncertainty raised the strongest reaction. The message communicated by 
scientists in the second sequence about uncertainty related to extrapolation from animals to 
humans generated significant confusion. Arguments brought by participants for such a reaction 
focused the fact that animal studies have been validated—by extensive previous experience—
as a viable replacement for ethically impossible human experimentation. Therefore, 
challenging animal studies raises radical questions both about the possibility or not to test 
toxicological properties of contaminants in laboratory, and about the real relevance of 
extrapolated results that led to marketed chemicals currently present in consumer products. 
4. PANIC ABOUT CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
As shown in the introduction, some science communicators assume that communicating 
uncertainty would cause panic among laypeople. Our results invalidate this assumption. 
 After receiving scientific messages both with our without uncertainty, participants 
expressed panic when they perceived lack of control over the negative effects:  
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• messages without uncertainty that indicated a causal relationship between EDs and 
male reproductive disorders induced fear because of the ubiquitous nature of ED 
exposure, which makes it impossible to control their (known) dangers  
• uncertainty communication elicited relief rather than fear, except when participants 
associated uncertainty with an inability to precisely identify the cause of the decline in 
male fertility and hence the ability to control it  
All but one participant3 who expressed anxiety and fear following sequences with uncertainty 
also expressed the same feelings after videos without uncertainty. They associated these 
feelings with the inability to control potential negative health effects when the causative agent 
is not precisely known. These participants completely dismissed the causal relationship 
between EDs and male reproductive disorders when there was associated uncertainty. For this 
category of participants, uncertainty was enough to dismiss the scientific messages that were 
not associated with uncertainty.  
 Citizen: “At the same time, this is not necessarily more reassuring because, ultimately, 
the first [video] provided a cause, so one knows where to act; but here, see that this range [of 
factors] is open.” 
Participants who felt alarmed,4 anxious or frightened after sequences without uncertainty 
associated these feelings with lack of control over the (known) effects of EDs on health 
because of their ubiquitous presence in daily life, their invisibility, past experience of risks, and 
lack of trust that policy makers can adequately control them. These feelings were also elicited 
by epidemiologic information on male reproductive disorders. Even though the messages 
transmitted by scientists were questioned on several points, they were sufficiently trusted to 
produce strong feelings about the negative effects of EDs.  
 Citizen: “Yes, this scared me a lot.” 
 Citizen: “Perfume fixatives are worrying. This does not make us feel like using 
[perfumes] anymore.” 
Comparatively, women expressed fear more often than men. 
5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED UNCERTAINTY AND DEMOGRAPHIC 
PARAMETERS 
The analysis used a total of 455 PDU (Perceived Degree of Uncertainty) score values, i.e., 5 
successive scores for the question corresponding to each sequence with/without uncertainty 
(Q1, Q2, …, Q5), for each of the 91 subjects, except 4 subjects who chose no value for 1 or 2 
sequences. 
 We have examined the relation between the increase or decrease in perceived 
uncertainty and several demographic variables, i.e., gender (F/M), monthly household income 
(around 1000 Euros, 1500, 2500, 4000), post-graduate (Yes/No), scientific studies (Yes/No, 
with 7 non-response), practice of a religion (Yes/No, with 15 non-response), occupation 
(student, employee, liberal profession/senior executive, farmer or other), age group (21–29, 
30–40, 41–69), and having children (Yes/No).  
                                                
3  Five participants explicitly expressed this feeling after sequences 2 and 4, of which 3 were women. 
4  30 participants explicitly expressed this feeling after sequences 1 and 3, of which 22 were women. 
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 Among the PDU-score differences, Q3–Q4 (message with/without extrapolation 
uncertainty) is the one most related to socio-economic variables.  
 The increase in uncertainty level following uncertainty communication is more often 
found for:  
• older people (compared to younger ones)  
• employees and liberal professions/senior executives (compared to other professions)  
• low education level (compared to higher levels) 
In other words, people increase easier their degree of perceived uncertainty following 
uncertainty communication (i.e., are more easily responsive to messages containing 
uncertainty), if they are in one of these categories.  
 The Q2–Q1 difference (i.e., perceived uncertainty following uncertainty 
communication in the sequence Q2) is significantly related to a few socio-economic variables, 
with a more important decrease from Q1 to Q2, for:  
• employees (compared to other professions), 
• non-scientific studies (compared to scientific studies) 
The practice of religion is significantly associated to repetitive uncertainty communication, i.e., 
Q24–Q13. 
 6. A MODEL FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMITTED AND PERCEIVED 
UNCERTAINTY 
Based on existing literature and our own results, we propose a model (Fig. 1) for the 
communication of uncertainty associated with environmental and health risks. 
 This model highlights the role of each of the three components of any communication 
process:  
• the transmitter (which is, in our case, the scientist, but can be a regulatory agency, a 
policy maker, a representative of an NGO or professional organization, etc.) 
• the receiver (in our case, the general public, but may also be policy makers, 
stakeholders, etc.) 
• the communication process itself, having its own characteristics. Indeed, this 
component is sometimes forgotten from risk or uncertainty studies, leading to 
incomplete focus either on the transmitter (assuming that the receiver will receive the 
message as intended by the transmitter, e.g., the deficit model) or on the receiver 
(leading to narrow formulations of the source message, in discrepancy with the 
diversity of uncertainty types and framings in the real world communication) 
There is a process of transformation of the message during the communication process, which 
depends in our case not only on the substantive features embodied in the message by the 
transmitter (e.g., with or without uncertainty), but also on: 
• the characteristics of the process (e.g., the nature of the communication support, 
video, text or other),  
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• the characteristics of the context in which the message is positioned (e.g., socio-
economic, political and cultural connotations of science and/or of the particular 
scientific topics addressed)  
• the features of the transmitter him/herself (e.g., academia or industry researcher),  
• the features of the audience (e.g., socio-economic status, level of education, etc.) (Fig. 
1)  
 
Fig.1. A model for the communication of uncertainty about health and environmental risks 
Transmitter 
(e.g., 
scientist) 
Receiver 
(e.g., the 
public) 
Features of the 
message as intended 
by the transmitter  
E.g., containing 
methodological 
uncertainty, expressed 
as probabilities or in 
another way 
 
Features of the message received  
E.g., containing perceived data uncertainty 
Features of the 
transmitter 
E.g., academia / 
industry researcher 
 
Features of the mediation 
support 
E.g., video, audio or text 
 
Type of the mediation 
support 
E.g., general or specialist media, 
interpersonal discussions, 
specialized information from 
government or NGOs 
 
Socio-economic, political 
or cultural context  
E.g., government actions for 
managing risks/uncertainty, 
production and consumption 
patterns 
Demographic features of the receiver  
E.g., level of scientific education, age 
Emotions in the receiver  
E.g., trust, fear, optimism 
Risk judgments  
E.g., perceived risk likelihood (i.e., 
probability), perceived potential for 
catastrophic outcomes 
Level of knowledge about the risk 
issue 
E.g., quantity and quality of knowledge 
obtained from the media 
Communication 
process 
Reference science model 
E.g., role of replicability in science, level of 
evidence produced by laboratory 
experimentation compared to epidemiologic 
studies  
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The transmitter will draft his/her message according to his/her knowledge or assumptions 
about each of the components of the model. Anyway, some of the components remain 
unknown to the emitter, due to their complex influence on the communication process (e.g., the 
socio-economic and political context). The transmitter cannot control all the aspects 
influencing the reception of his/her message. These components might equally remain 
unknown to the receiver, who might not be conscious of (or able to explain) all the reasons of 
his perception of the message. Indeed, the receiver will perceive the message according to the 
more or less conscious appraisal of the different parts of the model. The role of each 
component in the reception of the uncertain message has already been or can be highlighted by 
research in psychology, communication, etc.  
 As regards to uncertainty communication, this representation helps at better separating 
emitted from perceived uncertainty, understanding that each of them should be defined and 
characterized in its own way, and at distinguishing the contextual characteristics of the 
communication process itself. 
7. CONCLUSION  
There is currently relatively little research about perceived uncertainty (Powell et al., 2007) 
and almost any literature about how it relates to different patterns of emitted uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, there is an increasing need to understand how the public perceives the 
uncertainty communicated by scientists or by other science communicators. Indeed, many 
current risks must be communicated to the public potentially exposed to important hazards, 
when uncertainty about them is still present and sometimes important (e.g., risks from 
nanotechnologies, EDs, etc.). Furthermore, there is an increasing tendency from expert bodies 
like regulatory agencies (e.g., European Food Safety Authority, European Chemicals Agency) 
to communicate uncertainty associated with their risk assessments.  
 Research is needed for bridging the gap between increasingly abundant practices and 
research on expressing uncertainty (e.g., post-normal school) and relatively scarce research 
about how the audience (i.e., the public, the risk managers, the regulated industry, etc.) 
perceive these messages.  
 Using a quasi-realistic experimental setting and the case study of ED effects on male 
fertility, we have investigated the assumptions currently made by some scientists about the 
potential negative effects of uncertainty communication on lay publics. In particular, we have 
tested the assumption found in scientists by Frewer et al. (2003) that communicating 
uncertainty causes panic.  
 Our results contradict this assumption. Participants expressed relief rather than fear in 
reaction to uncertainty communication, except when they associated it with an inability to 
precisely identify the cause of, and therefore control, the decline in male fertility. Anyway, 
people also highlighted that the “dangers of relief” include reduced attention to and protective 
measures against a risk that may ultimately prove to be real.  
 Messages that indicated a causal relationship between EDs and male reproductive 
disorders without addressing uncertainty induced fear related to lack of control, because ED 
exposure is ubiquitous, making it impossible for people to control the (known) dangers. This 
confirms previous results on the central role of lack of control in lay people risk and 
uncertainty perceptions (Heath & Tversky, 1991; Siegrist, 2008). Fear is consistently 
associated with feeling unable to act on his/her own life, and also with demands that relevant 
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information about risks should be easily available to everyone. Though experts disagree and 
policy-makers may fail to protect public health, participants demand the right and the 
capability to make their own choices based on the available knowledge; they do not want to be 
artificially protected though lack of transparency.  
 We found that, in reaction to scientific messages, laypeople raised more and different 
uncertainties than the researchers originally raised. Causal, data, and methodological 
uncertainty were those most often highlighted by participants.  
 Perceived uncertainty was systematically associated with its sources, instead of being 
treated as global uncertainty. This confirms previous work (Rogers, 1999) indicating the 
differential perception of various types of uncertainty. From a regulatory point of view, this is 
important because it indicates that communication might be more effective if each of the 
relevant sources of uncertainty is addressed separately. Nevertheless, current policy initiatives 
such as the REACH regulation, dealing with risks from industrial chemicals (among which are 
EDs), propose approaches expressing cumulative uncertainty, in particular probabilistic risk 
assessments. Such tools might create a potential of miscommunication of uncertainty and their 
effects on the intended audience (i.e., risk managers) should be first tested before giving them 
regulatory weight.  
 About the relationship between demographic variables and perceived uncertainty, 
statistical analysis showed that: 
• uncertainty communication by academic researchers significantly increases the 
uncertainty perceived by people, on average; 
• the effect of repetitive uncertainty communication (e.g., Q24–Q13) is significantly 
more important for people who do not practice religion; 
• the higher the age and the household income, the easier uncertainty communication 
produces perceived uncertainty.  
 Also, the lower the education level and in absence of scientific studies, the easier 
uncertainty communication produces a change of judgment (i.e., perceived uncertainty). This 
facility to change opinion (i.e., perceive uncertainty) also seem to be more important for 
women, employees and liberal professions/senior executives, but this has to be confirmed in 
further experiments.  
 Based on these findings, our model for the communication of scientific uncertainty 
highlights all the complexity of the science and uncertainty communication process, which 
cannot be conceived as a linear transmission of information reaching the audience as the 
transmitter intends. 
 Previous literature showed an important influence of the source of uncertainty 
communication (i.e., public or industry scientists). Results previously reported for uncertainty 
communication by regulatory agencies (Johnson & Slovic, 1995, 1996) are therefore not 
necessarily comparable with our results obtained for uncertainty communication by 
researchers. We have the intuition that the reception of uncertainty will depend on the 
disciplines of the science communicator, and that our results obtained on communication by 
(eco-)toxicologists cannot necessarily be extrapolated without critical analysis to other 
domains of research (e.g., nuclear physicists).  
 Our results give a positive experimental feed-back for policies related to the public 
right to know, reinforcing the access to health and environmental information. They show that 
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lay publics are able to intelligently deal with scientific uncertainty, all by acknowledging and 
managing their own feelings related to it. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: This work has been funded by the Interdisciplinary Programme 
Communication Sciences of the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), and within 
the framework of the PRO-MALE project. 
REFERENCES 
Brashers, D.E. (2001). Communication and uncertainty management. Journal of Communication, 51(3), 477–497. 
Carnegie Commission (2011, December 4). Risk and the environment, improving regulatory decision making. 
Retrieved from www.ccstg.org/pdfs/RiskEnvironment0693.pdf 
Chow, C.C., & Sarin, R.K. (2001). Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg paradox. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 22(2), 129–139.  
Commission of the European Communities (1999). Community Strategy for Endocrine Disrupters, COM 706 
final, Brussels, Belgium. 
Fessenden-Raden, F., Fitchen, J.M., & Heath, J.S. (1987). Providing risk information in communities: Factors 
influencing what is heard and accepted. Science, Technology and Human Values, 12, 94–101. 
Frewer, L.J., Hunt, S., Brennan, M., Kuznesof, S., Ness, M., & Ritson, C. (2003). The view of scientific experts 
on how the public conceptualize uncertainty. Journal of risk research, 6(1), 75–85. 
Funtowicz, S.O., & Ravetz, J.R. (1990). Uncertainty and quality in science for policy. Dordrech: Kluwer. 
Habicht, F.H. (1992). Guidance to risk characterization for risk managers and risk assessors. Washington , DC: 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of the Administrator. 
Heath, C., & Tversky, A. (1991). Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty. 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4, 5–28. 
Johnson, B.B., & Slovic, P. (1995). Presenting uncertainty in health risk assessment: Initial studies on its effects 
on risk perception and trust. Risk analysis, 15(4), 485–494. 
Johnson, B.B., & Slovic, P. (1996). Lay views on uncertainty in health risk assessment: A report on phase II 
research. U.S. Environmental Agency for Environmental Protection. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Kuhn, K.M. (1997). Communicating uncertainty: Framing effects on responses to vague probabilities. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 71(1), 55–83. 
Patt, A.G., & Schrag, D.P. (2003). Using specific language to describe risk and probability. Climatic Change, 61, 
17–30.  
Powell, M., Dunwoody, S., Griffin, R. & Neuwirth, K. (2007). Exploring lay uncertainty about an environmental 
health risk. Public Understanding of Science, 16, 323–343. 
Renn, O. (2011). Science and society: Public engagement and confidence in science. Paper presented at The EFSA 
Consultative Workshop on Independence and Scientific Decision-making, Brussels, Belgium. 
Rogers, C.L. (1999). The importance of understanding audiences. In S.M. Friedman, S. Dunwoody and C.L. 
Rogers (Eds.), Communicating uncertainty: Media coverage of new and controversial science (pp. 179–200). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Siegrist, M., Stampfli, N., Kastenholz, H., & Keller, C. 2008. Perceived risk and perceived benefits of different 
nanotechnology food packaging. Appetite, 51, 283–290.  
Slovic, P. (1993). Perceived risk, trust and democracy: A systems perspective. Risk Analysis, 13, 675–682. 
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1982). Response mode, framing and information-processing effects 
in risk assessment. In R. Hogarth (Ed.), New directions for methodology of social and behavioral science: 
Question framing and response consistency (pp. 21–36). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.  
Slovic, P., Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1984). Modeling the societal impact of fatal accidents. Management 
Science, 30, 464–474. 
Van der Sluijs, J. (2002). A way out of the credibility crisis of models used in integrated environmental 
assessment. Futures, 34, 133–146. 
LAURA MAXIM, MARTINE CADOT, & PASCALE MANSIER 
274 
Weinstein, N.D. (1987). Public perceptions of environmental hazards: Statewide poll of environmental 
perceptions. Final report to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University. 
Weiss, C. (2003). Expressing scientific uncertainty. Law, Probability and Risk, 2, 25–46. 
 
 
